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LABOUR’S	  CAMPAIGN:	  THE	  CORRECT	  DIAGNOSIS	  BUT	  THE	  WRONG	  DOCTOR?1	  
	  
As	   Britons	   cast	   their	   votes,	   Labour	   pollsters	   told	   Ed	  Miliband	   to	   prepare	   to	   enter	  
Downing	  Street	  as	  Prime	  Minister.	  It	  was	  reasonable	  for	  Miliband	  to	  believe	  them:	  all	  
opinion	   surveys	   suggested	   he	   had	   a	   fair	   chance	   of	   emerging	   as	   the	   head	   of	   a	  
minority	  administration.	  So,	  when	  the	  BBC	  announced	  its	  Exit	  Poll,	  Miliband	  was	  not	  
alone	   in	   being	   shocked	   by	   its	   prediction	   of	   a	   Conservative	   government.	   For,	   if	  
Labour’s	  horrible	  performance	  in	  Scotland	  was	  widely	  anticipated,	  the	  party’s	  failure	  
to	   take	  more	   than	   a	   handful	   of	   Conservative-­‐held	   English	  marginal	   constituencies	  
was	  not.	  And	  it	  was	  in	  England,	  not	  Scotland,	  where	  Labour	  lost	  this	  election:	  even	  
had	  Miliband	  won	  all	  59	  seats	  north	  of	  the	  border,	  David	  Cameron	  would	  still	  have	  
been	  re-­‐elected	  Prime	  Minister.	  
Scotland	  did	  however	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  England.	  The	  false	  prediction	  of	  a	  
hung	  Parliament	  meant	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  minority	  Miliband	  government	  supported	  
by	  an	  ‘anti-­‐austerity’	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  (SNP)	  came	  to	  dominate	  English	  voters’	  
minds.	  According	   to	  Conservative	  propaganda	   this	  would	  be	   a	   ‘coalition	  of	   chaos’.	  
Dominated	   by	   SNP	   leader	   Nicola	   Sturgeon,	   a	  Miliband	   government	  would	   destroy	  
the	  economy	  while	  breaking	  up	  Britain.	  This	  grim	  prospect	  persuaded	  more	  than	  a	  
few	   English	   voters	   to	   support	   Cameron’s	   party	   rather	   than	   UKIP,	   the	   Liberal	  
Democrats	  –	  or	  Labour.	  	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  ‘coalition	  of	  chaos’	  narrative	  was	  however	  a	  symptom	  of	  a	  
deeper	  problem:	  Labour’s	  failure	  to	  evoke	  a	  positive	  response	  amongst	  the	  kinds	  of	  
voters	  whose	  support	  the	  party	  needed	  most	  if	  it	  was	  to	  return	  to	  office.	  Many	  had	  
doubts	  about	  the	  Conservatives,	  and	  some	  saw	  merit	  in	  parts	  of	  Labour’s	  approach.	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But	   most	   nonetheless	   considered	   Britain	   would	   be	   better	   led	   and	   the	   economy	  
managed	  more	  ably	  under	  Cameron	  rather	  than	  Miliband.	  On	  these	  critical	  issues	  of	  
‘statecraft’	   –	   in	   effect	   the	   art	   of	   governing	   competently	   -­‐	   Labour	   had	   trailed	   the	  
Conservatives	   since	   well	   before	   2010.2	  Given	   that,	   and	   irrespective	   of	   what	   the	  
opinion	  polls	  said,	  the	  result	  should	  not	  have	  been	  such	  a	  bolt	  from	  the	  blue.	  	  
	  
1.	  The	  Blairite	  version	  
In	   the	   wake	   of	   Labour’s	   defeat,	   commentators	   and	   party	   figures	   offered	   their	  
explanations.	  As	  Milband	  was	  elected	  leader	  in	  2010	  arguing	  the	  party	  had	  ‘to	  move	  
beyond	  New	  Labour’,	   it	  was	  no	  surprise	  that	  those	  associated	  with	  Tony	  Blair	  were	  
the	  first	  to	  point	  the	  finger.	  After	  all,	  Peter	  Mandelson,	  one	  of	  the	  architects	  of	  New	  
Labour,	  had	  warned	  Miliband	  even	  before	  he	  became	   leader	   that	   if	  he	  wanted	   ‘to	  
create	  a	  pre-­‐New	  Labour	  future	  for	  the	  party,	  then	  he	  …	  will	  quickly	  find	  that	  it	  is	  an	  
electoral	   cul-­‐de-­‐sac.’3	  With	   less	   than	   six	  months	   to	   go	   before	   polling,	   Blair	   himself	  
predicted	  that	  Miliband’s	  embrace	  of	  a	  ‘traditional	   left-­‐wing’	  agenda	  meant	  Labour	  
would	  lose.4	  	  
Veteran	  New	  Labour	  hands	  launched	  a	  media	  offensive	  that	  ensured	  they	  set	  
the	   tone	   for	   how	   many	   would	   explain	   the	   defeat.	   Three	   days	   after	   the	   election,	  
former	   minister	   Alan	   Milburn,	   described	   Miliband’s	   strategy	   as	   a	   ‘hideous	   and	  
ghastly	   experiment’,	   which	   had	   defied	   ‘the	   fundamentals	   of	   winning	   elections’.5	  
Preeminent	   Blair	   biographer,	   John	   Rentoul	   bluntly	   claimed	   2015,	   ‘was	   an	   election	  
that	   Labour	   could	   have	   won,	   and	   David	  Miliband	   could	   have	   won	   it’.	   For	   Ed	   had	  
discarded	  what	  Rentoul	  called	   ‘the	  eternal	  verities	  of	   the	  Blairite	   truth’,	  something	  
his	  brother	  would	  never	  have	  done.6	  According	  to	  Rentoul,	  a	  Blairite	  ‘wants	  to	  win	  as	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broad	  as	  possible	  a	  coalition	  of	  support	  on	  the	  centre	  and	  left	  to	  make	  the	  country	  
fairer,	  whereas	  the	  non-­‐Blairite	  left	  think	  you	  can	  go	  faster	  towards	  equality	  without	  
the	   centre	   because	   such	   change	   will	   generate	   its	   own	   support’.7	  For	   Rentoul	   and	  
others,	   keeping	   hold	   of	   the	   centre	   ground	   meant	   Miliband	   admitting	   Labour	   had	  
contributed	   to	   the	  deficit	  by	   spending	   too	  much	   in	  office,	  and	  supporting	  much	  of	  
the	   Cameron	   government’s	   austerity	  measures.	   Instead,	   by	   opposing	  many	   of	   the	  
government’s	  cuts	  and	  attacking	  business,	  Miliband	  embraced	  a	  ‘core	  vote	  strategy’.	  
Those	   seeking	   the	   party	   leadership	   after	   Miliband’s	   resignation	   embraced	  
much	  of	  this	  argument.	  According	  to	  Liz	  Kendall,	  Labour	  focused	  too	  much	  on	  issues	  
of	  concern	  only	  to	  the	  poorest	  voters,	  failing	  to	  indicate	  it	  understood	  middle-­‐class	  
‘aspirations	  and	  ambitions’.8	  As	   a	   result,	  Mary	  Creagh,	   argued,	   Labour	   lost	   ‘Middle	  
England’,	   that	   body	   of	   voters	   Blair	   is	   credited	  with	   bringing	   to	   the	   party	   in	   1997.	  	  
Small	  business	  owners	  were	  especially	  afraid	  of	  Labour,	  she	  claimed.9	  Indeed,	  Yvette	  
Cooper	   claimed	   Miliband	   promoted	   an	   ‘anti-­‐business,	   anti-­‐growth	   and	   ultimately	  
anti-­‐worker’	  agenda.10	  Even	  the	  trade	  union-­‐backed	  Andy	  Burnham	  claimed	  Labour	  
should	  have	  admitted	  it	  had	  spent	  too	  much	  in	  government.11	  
Adding	   just	   1.5%	   to	   Labour’s	   2010	   vote	   share	   was	   certainly	   a	   pathetic	  
achievement;	  and,	  thanks	  to	  the	  Scottish	  disaster,	  the	  party	  held	  26	  fewer	  seats	  than	  
in	  the	  previous	  election.	  But	  was	  this	  the	   inevitable	  result	  of	  Miliband’s	  attempt	  to	  
move	  on	  from	  New	  Labour?	  In	  1852	  Karl	  Marx	  claimed:	  ‘Men	  make	  their	  own	  history,	  
but	   they	   do	   not	   make	   it	   as	   they	   please;	   they	   do	   not	   make	   it	   under	   self-­‐selected	  
circumstances,	  but	  under	  circumstances	  existing	  already,	  given	  and	  transmitted	  from	  
the	   past’.12 	  Political	   scientists	   have	   subsequently	   explained	   change	   through	   the	  
‘structure-­‐agency’	  dichotomy,	  one	  that	  questions	  how	  far	  any	  agent,	  such	  as	  a	  party	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leader,	   can	   transform	   the	   context	   in	   which	   they	   exist.13	  This	   prism	   is	   especially	  
relevant	   to	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   Labour’s	   2015	   campaign,	   which	  
effectively	  began	  when	  Ed	  Miliband	  decided	  to	  stand	  as	  leader:	  for	  Miliband	  wanted	  
to	  change	  how	  his	  party	  did	  politics.	  	  
Miliband	  believed	  the	  2008	  banking	  collapse	  had	  transformed	  politics	  to	  such	  
an	  extent,	  if	  it	  were	  ever	  to	  win	  office	  again	  Labour	  had	  to	  campaign	  on	  a	  different	  
platform	   to	   the	   one	   established	   by	   New	   Labour	   in	   1997.	   But	   many	   in	   the	   party	  
disagreed.	   To	   many	   MPs	   and	   officials	   as	   well	   as	   some	   members,	   the	   majority	   of	  
whom	   had	   been	   schooled	   in	   ‘the	   eternal	   verities	   of	   the	   Blairite	   truth’,	  Miliband’s	  
strategy	   was	   wrong.	   To	   many	   of	   them,	   Miliband	   sought	   to	   turn	   it	   back	   into	   a	  
‘traditional	  left-­‐wing’	  party,	  one	  dominated	  by	  the	  unions	  and	  led	  by	  figures	  wanting	  
to	  ‘tax	  and	  spend’	  with	  no	  thought	  to	  its	  impact.	  But	  not	  only	  was	  this	  a	  grotesque	  
distortion	   of	   the	   pre-­‐Blair	   Labour	   party,	   it	   bore	   little	   relation	   to	   what	   Miliband	  
offered.	  
Yet,	   whatever	   was	   the	   character	   of	   the	   party	   he	   sought	   to	   lead,	   Miliband	  
indisputably	   did	   not	   persuade	   enough	   voters	   to	   support	   it.	   This	   chapter	   explores	  
how	  far	  that	  failure	  was	  due	  to	  his	  shortcomings,	  be	  they	  strategic	  or	  presentational,	  
or	   to	   the	   ‘circumstances	   existing	   already’.	   For	   it	   was	   never	   going	   to	   be	   easy	   for	  
Labour	  to	  bounce	  back	  from	  its	  2010	  defeat,	  especially	  as	  it	  had	  been	  largely	  due	  to	  
a	  recession	  for	  which	  many	  held	  the	  New	  Labour	  years	  responsible.	  This	  allowed	  the	  
Coalition	   to	   blame	   its	   austerity	   programme	   on	   Labour	   mismanagement	   while	  
reaping	   credit	   for	   any	   signs	  of	   recovery.	  Moreover,	   Labour	  was	  no	   longer	   the	   sole	  
repository	  for	  voters	  alienated	  by	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day:	  mid-­‐way	  through	  the	  
Parliament,	   the	  SNP	   in	  Scotland	  and	  UKIP	   in	  England	  claimed	   the	   support	  of	  many	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who	   might	   otherwise	   have	   voted	   Labour	   in	   2015.14	  In	   these	   circumstances,	   any	  
leader	  would	  have	  found	  it	  tricky	  mapping	  a	  route	  back	  to	  power.	  
	  
2.	  A	  new	  leader	  for	  a	  new	  era	  
Even	  before	  2010	  many	  in	  the	  party	  wanted,	  as	  the	  Blairite	  James	  Purnell	  put	  it	  after	  
resigning	  from	  Gordon	  Brown’s	  Cabinet	  in	  2009,	  ‘to	  open	  up	  New	  Labour,	  reinvent	  it	  
and	  then	  eventually	  move	  beyond	  it.’15	  Having	  won	  two	  landslides	  the	  party’s	  2005	  
re-­‐election	   was	   more	   difficult	   -­‐	   but	   Blair’s	   departure	   two	   years	   later	   was	  
unaccompanied	   by	   any	   rethinking.	  Moreover,	   even	   before	   the	   2008	   crisis,	   growth	  
had	  been	  slowing	  and	  voters	  were	  less	  keen	  on	  public	  spending.	  It	  was	  however	  the	  
banking	  collapse	  that	  did	   for	  New	  Labour,	   the	  moment	  at	  which	  the	  Conservatives	  
resumed	  their	  traditional	  place	  as	  the	  party	  most	  trusted	  to	  manage	  the	  economy.	  
Defeat	   convinced	   all	   but	   the	   most	   recidivistic	   Blairite	   that	   a	   critical	   eye	  
needed	  to	  be	  cast	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2010.	  For	  New	  Labour	  had	  emerged	  amidst	  
a	  time	  of	  economic	  buoyancy	  in	  which	  Blair	  claimed	  Labour	  could	  make	  Britain	  fairer	  
but	   within	   the	   free	   market	   and	   without	   increasing	   taxes.	   If	   the	   Blair-­‐Brown	  
governments	   modestly	   reduced	   poverty	   and	   inequality,	   the	   fiscal	   crisis	   –	   and	   the	  
system	  of	  deregulation	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  -­‐	  threw	  this	  achievement	  into	  reverse.	  
Britons	  now	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  austerity,	  job	  insecurity	  and	  falling	  real	  incomes	  –	  and	  
many	  blamed	  Labour	  for	  all	  three.	  Having	  been	  forced	  to	  raise	  the	  top	  rate	  of	  tax	  to	  
50%,	  to	  help	  pay	  for	  the	  billions	  needed	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  banks,	   in	  2009	  Labour	  also	  
lost	   the	   support	   of	   an	   important	  media	   ally,	   Rupert	  Murdoch,	  who	   controlled	  The	  
Sun.	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Most	  Labour	  members	  therefore	  looked	  on	  the	  first	  leadership	  election	  since	  
1994	   as	   their	   chance	   to	   choose	   someone	   who	   could	   set	   a	   new	   course.16	  David	  
Miliband	  was	   the	  most	  experienced	   figure	   in	   the	   field	  of	   five.	  Despite	  being	  Blair’s	  
preferred	   candidate	   he	   was	   not	   uncritical	   of	   the	   Blair	   legacy,	   even	   proposing	   a	  
‘mansion	  tax’	  on	  homes	  valued	  at	  £2	  million	  or	  more.	  Most	  however	  still	  saw	  David	  –	  
for	  good	  or	  ill	  –	  as	  a	  creature	  of	  the	  New	  Labour	  establishment.	  The	  former	  minister	  
for	  Climate	  Change,	  David’s	   younger	  brother	  Ed,	  believed	  only	  he	  could	   ‘decisively	  
move	  the	  Labour	  Party	  on	  from	  the	  Blair-­‐Brown	  era’.	  Sensing	  the	  mood	  for	  change	  in	  
the	  party	  he	  stressed	  more	  than	  did	  his	  brother	  New	  Labour’s	  shortcomings.17	  	  
While	  a	  YouGov	  poll	  suggested	  David	  was	  the	  choice	  of	  47%	  of	  voters	  to	  Ed’s	  
19%,	  Labour’s	  electoral	  college	  thought	  differently:	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  just	  1.3%,	  Ed	  won.	  
Divided	  into	  three	  equal	  parts,	  in	  this	  college	  of	  MPs	  and	  MEPs,	  party	  members	  and	  
trade	   union	   levy	   payers,	   David’s	   support	  was	   concentrated	   amongst	   the	   first	   two,	  
Ed’s	  in	  the	  third.	  Yet	  Ed’s	  union	  support	  was	  on	  such	  a	  scale	  it	  compensated	  for	  his	  
minority	  position	  amongst	  MPs	  and	  members.	  This	  led	  some	  to	  claim	  that	  leaders	  of	  
the	   largest	   unions	   had	   ‘fixed’	   the	   contest	   in	   Ed’s	   favour	   although	   none	   produced	  
evidence	   of	   fraud.	   The	   truth	  many	   found	   hard	   to	   swallow	  was	   that	   the	   party	   had	  
elected	  someone	  promising	  to	  take	  the	  party	  in	  a	  radically	  different	  direction	  to	  the	  
one	  mapped	  out	  by	  Blair.	  	  
How	   much	   of	   a	   change	   Miliband	   offered	   will	   be	   analysed	   below,	   but	   his	  
narrow	  victory	  meant	  he	  was,	  as	  an	  advisor	  put	  it,	  always	  conscious	  of	  the	  ‘thinness	  
of	  his	  mandate’.	   Indicating	  his	  desire	  for	  conciliation,	  he	  twice	  asked	  his	  brother	  to	  
be	   shadow	  Chancellor.	   For	   even	   if	  Miliband	  had	  wanted	   to,	   he	   could	   not	   base	   his	  
leadership	  in	  the	  unions:	  while	  their	  votes	  helped	  him	  become	  leader,	  he	  feared	  that	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too	  close	  an	  association	  would	  harm	  him	  in	  many	  voters’	  eyes.	  Thus,	  during	  his	  first	  
leader’s	  speech	  Miliband	  criticised	  ‘irresponsible	  strikes’	  and	  events	  associated	  with	  
the	  selection	  of	  a	  candidate	   for	   the	  2013	  Falkirk	  by-­‐election	  suggest	  he	  was	  hardly	  
the	  unions’	  unalloyed	  ally.18	  Yet,	  only	  a	  minority	  of	  MPs	  were	  convinced	  supporters	  
and	  most	  of	  the	  Shadow	  Cabinet	  supported	  David,	  as	  had	  those	  at	  Labour’s	  London	  
HQ,	  some	  of	  them	  being	  reduced	  to	  tears	  when	  they	  heard	  he’d	  lost.19	  Ed	  Miliband	  
was	   consequently	   said	   to	   cut	   an	   isolated	   figure	   in	   his	   own	  party.	   At	   best	   the	   new	  
leader	  could	  expect	  passive	  acquiescence	  from	  the	  Labour	  machine	  for	  his	  change	  of	  
course.	  
	  
3.	  A	  post-­‐New	  Labour	  strategy	  	  
Miliband’s	  victory	  did	  not	  end	  the	  debate	  over	  Labour’s	  new	  course.	  If	  advocates	  of	  
‘Blue	  Labour’	  wanted	  the	  party	  to	  drop	  its	  unquestioned	  embrace	  of	  the	  free	  market,	  
members	  of	  Progress	  supported	  a	  modified	  Blairism.	  Miliband	  even	  initiated	  a	  policy	  
review	   although	   it	   is	   questionable	   how	   seriously	   he	   took	   that	   enterprise.	   For	  
Miliband	  already	  knew	  his	  own	  mind.	  He	  sought	  not	  a	  ‘pre-­‐New	  Labour	  future’	  but	  a	  
recalibration	  of	  Blair’s	  approach,	  not	  to	  abandon	  the	  centre	  ground	  but	  to	  talk	  to	  it	  
in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  
During	  the	  leadership	  campaign	  Miliband	  had	  praised	  New	  Labour’s	  ability	  to	  
unite	   lower	   and	   middle-­‐income	   voters	   around	   its	   ability	   to	   speak	   to	   ‘people’s	  
aspirations.’20	  But	   if	   Blair	   claimed	   he	   could	   help	   voters	   achieve	   their	   individual	  
‘aspirations’	   in	   an	   era	   of	   affluence,	   Miliband	   believed	   he	   had	   to	   address	   their	  
collective	   ‘anxieties’	   in	   an	   era	   of	   insecurity.	   If	   Blair	   spoke	   for	   ‘Middle	   England’,	  
Miliband	  aimed	  to	  represent	  the	  ‘Squeezed	  Middle’,	  a	  term	  mooted	  by	  John	  Healey	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while	  still	  a	  minister	  in	  the	  Brown	  government,	  and	  which	  signified	  that	  large	  part	  of	  
the	   population	  whose	   living	   standards	  were	   predicted	   to	   remain	   below	  what	   they	  
had	  been	  before	  the	  fiscal	  crisis	  for	  years	  to	  come.21	  	  
In	   setting	   his	   course	   Miliband	   left	   unresolved	   one	   vital	   matter	   from	   New	  
Labour’s	  past.	  Various	  polls	  suggested	  that	  while	  a	  majority	  considered	  the	  banks	  to	  
blame	  for	  the	  crash	  at	  least	  one-­‐third	  believed	  responsibility	  lay	  with	  the	  Blair-­‐Brown	  
governments.	  Conservatives	  certainly	  claimed	  their	  Coalition	  was	  merely	  clearing	  up	  
the	  mess	   left	   by	   Labour,	   an	   accusation	  made	  with	   ever-­‐greater	   vehemence	   in	   the	  
short	  campaign.	  Labour’s	  own	  research	  suggested	  this	  assertion	  resonated	  strongly	  
with	  those	  whom	  the	  party	  needed	  to	  win	  back.	  If	  unclear	  how	  Labour	  was	  to	  blame	  
for	   the	   deficit,	   many	   voters	   were	   confident	   it	   had	   mismanaged	   the	   country’s	  
finances	  and	  so	  could	  not	  be	  again	  trusted	  to	  run	  the	  economy.	  
During	   the	   first	   months	   of	   Miliband’s	   leadership,	   arguments	   raged	   over	  
whether	  the	  party	  should	  defend	  the	  late	  government’s	  record	  or	  concede	  mistakes	  
were	  made.22	  It	   was	   however	   unknowable	   if	   either	   tactic	   would	   change	  minds	   or	  
reinforce	  existing	  views.	  In	  any	  case,	  Ed	  Balls,	  the	  shadow	  Chancellor,	  did	  not	  believe	  
Labour	   had	   anything	   for	   which	   to	   apologise,	   as	   spending	   levels	   had	   not	   been	  
especially	   high.	   If	   many	   economists	   endorsed	   his	   view,	   leading	   Blairites	   believed	  
Brown	  (but	  not	  Blair)	  had	  been	  culpable,	  although	  even	  they	  were	  divided	  over	  the	  
issue.	   With	   his	   shadow	   Cabinet	   also	   split,	   Miliband	   believed	   he	   should	   leave	   this	  
matter	  to	  History,	  confident	  he	  could	  concentrate	  voters’	  attention	  on	  his	  message	  
for	  the	  future.	  	  	  
Right	   from	   the	   start	  Miliband	  believed,	   as	   an	  adviser	  put	   it,	   that	   ‘taking	  on	  
vested	  interests	  would	  be	  his	  calling	  card’.	  He	  cast	  himself	  as	  a	  tribune	  of	  the	  people,	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standing	  up	  to	  the	  powerful	  to	  ensure	  fair	  treatment	  for	  the	  ‘hard-­‐working	  majority’.	  
It	  was	  this	  ambition	  that	   informed	  his	  support	  for:	  the	  curbing	  of	  energy	  prices;	  an	  
investigation	  into	  invasions	  of	  privacy	  committed	  by	  News	  International	   journalists;	  
and	  challenging	  tax	  avoiders.	  Miliband	  outlined	  his	  new	  course	  during	  Labour’s	  2011	  
annual	  conference.	  Surprisingly,	  given	  his	  reputation,	  Miliband	  told	  those	  assembled	  
that	  Margaret	   Thatcher	   had	   introduced	   necessary	   reforms,	   such	   as	   selling	   council	  
houses	  to	  tenants,	  cutting	  punitive	  income	  tax	  rates	  and	  reforming	  trade	  union	  laws.	  
More	   conventionally,	   he	   praised	   New	   Labour	   for	   building	   schools	   and	   hospitals,	  
introducing	  a	  minimum	  wage	  and	  reducing	  child	  poverty.	  But	  both,	  he	  argued,	  had	  
left	   unchanged	   ‘the	   values	   of	   our	   economy’.	   This	   meant	   that	   even	   before	   the	  
banking	   collapse,	   ‘the	   grafters,	   the	  hard-­‐working	  majority	  who	  do	   the	   right	   thing’,	  
stopped	   being	   adequately	   rewarded	   for	   their	   efforts.	   Their	   ambitions	   were	  
frustrated	  as	  those	  at	  the	  top	  took	  what	  they	  wanted	  and	  it	  was	  this	  pursuit	  of	  the	  
‘fast	  buck’,	  Milband,	  argued,	  that	  had	  caused	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  
Miliband	  believed	   the	  banking	   crisis	   proved	  Britain	   needed,	   not	   ‘traditional	  
left-­‐wing’	   policies,	   but	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   capitalism,	   one	   that	   looked	   beyond	   the	  
short-­‐term.	  He	  wanted	   to	  promote	  a	   fairer	  and	   therefore	  more	  efficient	  economy,	  
believing	   that	   if	  workers	  were	   treated	  better	   they	  would	  become	  more	  productive	  
and	  contribute	  more	  effectively	  to	  an	  expanding	  economy.	  For	  inspiration,	  Miliband	  
and	  his	  team	  looked	  to	  Germany	  but	  also	  the	  United	  States	  and	  President	  Theodore	  
Roosevelt	   who	   broke	   up	   abusive	  monopolies.	   This	   was	   because,	  Miliband	   argued,	  
parts	  of	  the	  economy	  no	  longer	  served	  consumers’	  interests.	  In	  announcing	  plans	  to	  
establish	  an	  Annual	  Competition	  Audit	   to	  challenge	  monopolies	  such	  as	  was	   found	  
	   10	  
amongst	   energy	   suppliers	   he	   even	   declared:	   ‘It’s	   Labour	   that	   is	   the	   party	   of	  
competition’.23	  
If	   Miliband	   claimed	   that	   ‘all	   parties	   must	   be	   pro-­‐business	   today’,	   he	  
distinguished	  between	  business	   leaders	   such	   as	   Fred	  Goodwin,	  who	   ran	   the	  Royal	  
Bank	  of	  Scotland	  into	  the	  ground	  while	  making	  millions	  for	  himself,	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  
John	   Rose,	   of	   Rolls	   Royce,	   a	  man	  who	   created	  wealth	   and	   jobs.	  Miliband	   said	   he	  
would	  support	  those	  emulating	  Rose,	  entrepreneurs,	  he	  termed	  the	  ‘producers’	  who	  
‘train,	   invest,	   invent,	   sell’	   rather	   than	   ‘predators’	   like	   Goodwin	   just	   interested	   in	  
‘taking	  what	   they	   can’.	   This	  would	   be	   achieved	   through	  measures	   the	  modesty	   of	  
which	   belied	  Miliband’s	   radical	   rhetoric,	   including:	   helping	   small	   businesses	   more	  
easily	   access	   credit	   and	   giving	   government	   contracts	   only	   to	   firms	   with	   adequate	  
apprenticeship	  schemes.	  	  
There	  was	  an	  unresolved	  timidity	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Miliband’s	  readjustment	  of	  
the	  New	  Labour	  approach.	  Blair	  pursued	  an	  ostensibly	  ‘preference	  accommodation’	  
strategy,	   one	   that	   listened	   to	   what	   voters	   said	   they	   wanted	   and	   presented	   the	  
appearance	  of	  giving	   it	   to	   them.24	  New	  Labour	   therefore	  did	  not	  directly	   challenge	  
the	   public’s	   preconceptions	   but,	   having	   won	   their	   support,	   covertly	   tackled	   core	  
Labour	   issues,	   notably	   inequality.	   Miliband’s	   biggest	   criticism	   of	   New	   Labour	   was	  
however	   that	   its	   leaders’	  were	   relatively	   uninterested	   in	   equality,	   something	   Blair	  
conceded.25	  He	   therefore	   wanted	   equality	   put	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   Labour’s	   message,	  
even	  though	  according	  to	  Ipsos-­‐Mori	  it	  was	  an	  issue	  of	  concern	  to	  no	  more	  than	  one-­‐
sixth	  of	  voters.	  This	  meant	  Miliband	  –	  unlike	  Blair	   -­‐	  needed	  to	  adopt	  a	   ‘preference	  
shaping’	   strategy,	   one	  designed	   to	  persuade	   voters	  of	   the	   issue’s	   importance.	   Yet,	  
while	   his	   2011	   speech	   argued	   that	   a	   more	   equal	   society	   would	   create	   a	   more	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productive	   economy,	   the	   imperative	   for	   equality	   remained	   an	   underdeveloped	  
rhetorical	  theme	  during	  Miliband’s	  leadership.	  
	  
4.	  Mis-­‐communicating	  the	  message	  
It	  is	  one	  thing	  for	  a	  party	  leader	  to	  have	  a	  strategy	  and	  quite	  another	  to	  successfully	  
convey	   it	   to	   the	   public.	   And	   his	   2011	   address	   illustrated	   some	   of	   Miliband’s	  
difficulties	  with	   regard	   to	  communication.	  The	  annual	   conference	   speech	   is	  one	  of	  
the	  few	  times	  a	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  has	  more	  media	  attention	  than	  the	  Prime	  
Minister.	  Yet,	   instead	  of	  being	  seen	  as	  outlining	  a	  vision	  of	  an	  economy	  productive	  
and	  fair	  the	  meaning	  of	  his	  speech	  was	  subverted	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  some	  saw	  it	  as	  
‘anti-­‐business’.	  
Miliband’s	   inept	   delivery	   did	   not	   help:	   that	   allowed	   his	   shortcomings	   to	  
become	  the	  story	  of	  the	  speech.	  More	  fatally,	  Miliband	  did	  not	  appreciate	  how	  far	  
journalists	  needed	  help	  navigating	  his	  unfamiliar	   ‘predator/producer’	  distinction.	   In	  
briefing	  the	  press,	  Labour’s	  communications	  team	  could	  not	  give	  examples	  of	  which	  
kinds	   of	   businesses	   were	   ‘predators’	   and	   those	   that	   were	   ‘producers’.	   Miliband’s	  
Front	   Bench	   colleagues	   had	   also	   not	   been	   informed,	   so	   they	   gave	   journalists	  
inconsistent	   answers.	   Confusion	   abounded.	   Even	   sympathizers	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	  
know	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  speech:	  one	  even	  wondered	  if	  the	  ‘predators’	  section	  was	  
padding.26 	  With	   the	   right-­‐wing	   media	   already	   keen	   to	   depict	   him	   as	   ‘Red	   Ed’,	  
according	  to	  one	  journalist	  the	  speech	  was	  ‘very	  easy	  pickings	  for	  the	  press’.	  Some	  
New	   Labour	   ‘spin’	  might	   have	   helped	  Miliband	   get	   his	  message	   to	   the	   public:	   but	  
that	  was	  something	  he	  ostentatiously	  disavowed.	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Milband’s	   team	   was	   taken	   aback	   by	   the	   media	   reaction	   so	   they	   quickly	  
dispensed	  ‘predators	  and	  producers’.	  Ironically,	  a	  Yougov	  poll	  suggested	  55%	  of	  the	  
public	   agreed	  with	  Miliband’s	   assertion	   that	   ‘predators,	   not	   producers’	   dominated	  
the	  economy.	  Indeed,	  his	  call	  for	  a	  ‘responsible	  capitalism’	  was	  subsequently	  echoed	  
–	   although	   not	   acknowledged	   -­‐	   by	   David	   Cameron.	   This	   suggested	   Miliband	   had	  
identified	   an	   important	   issue.	   But	   instead	   of	   expanding	   on	   his	   strategic	   message	  
Labour	  retreated	  behind	  a	  series	  of	  ‘retail	  offers’	  that	  exploited	  people’s	  immediate	  
sense	   that	   their	   standards	   of	   living	   were	   declining	   under	   austerity.	   The	   most	  
successful	   of	   these	  offers	  was	  Miliband’s	   2013	  pledge	   to	   freeze	   energy	  prices.	   Yet	  
while	  making	  an	  impressive	  impact	  it	  was	  not	  part	  of	  a	  sustained	  attempt	  to	  reshape	  
how	  voters	  thought	  about	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  left	  Labour	  vulnerable	  when	  
energy	  prices	   fell.	   It	  also	  did	  nothing	   to	  address	   the	  party’s	  poor	  economic	   record,	  
meaning	   that	   while	   voters	   believed	   Labour	   was	   broadly	   on	   their	   side,	   tea	   and	  
sympathy	   notwithstanding,	   it	   was	   not	   the	   best	   party	   to	   get	   the	   economy	  moving	  
again.	  	  
Yet,	  when	   explaining	   his	  message	   arguably	  Miliband’s	   biggest	   problem	  was	  
Miliband	   himself	   -­‐	   or	   rather	   the	   ‘Ed	   Miliband’	   constructed	   by	   the	   media.	   All	  
politicians	  have	  to	  tackle	  the	  gap	  between	  who	  they	  are	  and	  how	  they	  are	  perceived,	  
and	   there	   was	   some	   substance	   to	   this	   ‘Miliband’.	   When	   running	   for	   leader	   -­‐	   the	  
moment	   he	   first	   came	   to	   public	   notice	   -­‐	   one	   member	   of	   the	   Lobby	   claimed:	   ‘he	  
looked	  like	  a	  dweeb’.	  Miliband	  was	  certainly	  not	  the	  most	  adept	  public	  speaker	  and	  
his	  adenoidal	  voice	  was	  not	  an	  asset.	  As	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  bitter	  legacy	  of	  the	  
leadership	   contest,	   it	   was	   members	   of	   David’s	   campaign	   who	   suggested	   these	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attributes	   made	   Ed	   ‘weird’;	   they	   were	   also	   the	   first	   to	   compare	   him	   with	   the	  
animated	  character	  ‘Wallace’.27	  	  
Miliband	   initially	  did	  not	  care	  about	  such	  seemingly	  superficial	  matters.	  But	  
over	  time	  he	  was	  persuaded	  otherwise:	  by	  the	  short	  campaign	  he	  dressed	  better	  and	  
his	  public	  addresses	  were	  more	  competently	  delivered.	  Miliband	  even	  –	  allegedly	  -­‐	  
had	   his	   adenoids	   removed.	   Yet,	   throughout	   his	   leadership	   the	   Labour	   leader	   was	  
dogged	  by	  questions	  about	  why	  so	  many	  thought	  him	  ‘weird’	  or	  a	  ‘geek’.	  With	  less	  
than	  twelve	  months	  before	  polling	  day,	  he	  was	  forced	  to	  confront	  the	  issue	  head-­‐on,	  
stating:	  ‘If	  you	  want	  the	  politician	  from	  central	  casting,	  it's	  not	  me;	  it's	  the	  other	  guy.	  
…	   I	  want	   to	  offer	   something	  different’.28	  But	  many	   voters	   did	  not	  want	   something	  
‘different’	  and	  while	  claiming	  to	  be	  the	  candidate	  of	  ‘substance’	  many	  did	  not	  know	  
of	  what	   substance	  Miliband	  was	  made.	   For	   a	   public	   ignorant	   about	   policy,	   how	   a	  
party	   leader	   looks	   is	   their	   guide	   to	  what	   the	  person	   is	   like.	   Physical	   attractiveness	  
does	  play	  a	  part	  in	  political	  success:	  the	  superficial	  is	  the	  substance.29	  	  
An	  important	  influence	  on	  how	  the	  public	  regarded	  Miliband	  was	  the	  tabloid	  
press,	   all	   but	  one	   title	  of	  which	  backed	   the	  Conservatives	   in	   2010.	  With	  The	   Sun’s	  
daily	  circulation	  halving	  to	  two	  million	  between	  1997	  and	  2015,	  Miliband’s	  advisors	  
believed	  the	  press	  was	   less	   important	   than	   in	   the	  1990s.	  Labour’s	  communications	  
team	   knew,	   however,	   that	   the	   press	   influenced	   what	   appeared	   on	   radio	   and	  
television:	  BBC	  journalists	  in	  particular	  often	  let	  their	  peers	  in	  print	  dictate	  what	  they	  
reported	  as	  ‘news’.	  	  
Miliband’s	   media	   problems	   intensified	   in	   2011	   when	   he	   supported	   an	  
investigation	  into	  the	  phone	  hacking	  activities	  of	  News	  International	  journalists	  and	  
backed	   the	   resulting	   Leveson	   Inquiry’s	  proposals	   to	   regulate	   the	  press.	  Considered	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by	  a	  Labour	  HQ	  insider	  to	  be	  a	  ‘brave	  and	  principled	  stand’	  they	  also	  saw	  this	  stance	  
as	   a	   ‘mistake’.	   For	   the	   return	  of	   a	   Labour	   government	  now	   threatened	  Murdoch’s	  
commercial	   interests,	   as	   well	   as	   those	   other	   media	   magnates.	   As	   a	   result	   most	  
tabloids,	   other	   than	   The	  Mirror,	   repeatedly	   draw	   readers’	   attention	   to	   the	   Labour	  
leader’s	   ‘weirdness’.	   Miliband’s	   ‘alien’	   character	   was	   subtly	   indicated	   through	  
references	  to	  his	  North	  London,	  intellectual	  and,	  more	  slyly,	  Jewish	  origin	  -­‐	  or	  more	  
crudely	   by	   exploiting	   his	   late	   father’s	   Marxism	   so	   as	   to	   imply	   the	   Labour	   leader	  
‘hated	   Britain’.	   A	   favoured	   tactic	   was	   publishing	   photographs	   that	  made	  Miliband	  
look	  odd,	  most	  notoriously	  one	  taken	  in	  2014	  in	  which	  he	  unskilfully	  tackled	  a	  large	  
bacon	  sandwich.	  That	  particular	  shot	  was	  reproduced	  many	  times,	  on	  television	  quiz	  
and	   comedy	   programmes	   as	  well	   as	   across	   the	   front	   page	   of	   The	   Sun	   just	   before	  
polling	  day,	  replete	  with	  the	  headline:	  ‘Save	  Our	  Bacon’.	  	  
Added	  to	  this	  mix	  was	  that	  Miliband	  became	  party	  leader	  by	  beating	  his	  older	  
brother.	  Labour’s	  own	  research	  revealed	  that	  one	  of	  the	  few	  things	  voters	  ever	  knew	  
about	  Miliband	  was	   that	  he	  had	   ‘stabbed	  his	  brother	   in	   the	  back’.	   In	  an	  era	  when	  
politics	   means	   so	   little	   but	   family	   so	   much,	   this	   soap	   opera	   narrative	   resonated,	  
evoking	  as	  it	  did	  the	  Bible’s	  Cain	  and	  Abel.	  Reactions	  to	  Ed’s	  temerity	  went	  beyond	  
politics:	   the	   left-­‐wing	   MP	   John	   Cruddas	   supported	   David	   largely	   because	   of	   the	  
visceral	  ‘brother	  thing’.30	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  brew,	  Miliband	  –	  who	  aspired	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  powerful	  
on	  behalf	  of	   the	  people	  –	  was	  more	   like	  a	  broken	  reed	  than	  a	   tribune.	  He	  actively	  
harmed	   Labour’s	   electoral	   prospects	   such	   that	   a	  May	   2014	   ComRes	   poll	   indicated	  
that	  40%	  of	  Britons	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  vote	  Labour	  while	  Miliband	  remained	  leader.	  
This	  would	  not	  have	   surprised	  party	  workers	  across	   the	   country.	  According	   to	  one	  
	   15	  
who	  fought	  many	  by-­‐elections	  held	  after	  2010	  it	  was	  not	  unusual	  for	  voters	  to	  state:	  
‘I’m	   always	   Labour,	   but’	   –	   as	   their	   preface	   to	   an	   attack	   on	  Miliband.	   The	   Labour	  
candidate	  for	  Warrington	  South	  claimed	  the	  ‘Ed	   issue	  never	  stopped	  coming	  up	  on	  
the	   doorstep	   –	   too	   many	   people	   just	   did	   not	   see	   him	   as	   an	   alternative	   prime	  
minister.’31	  According	  to	  one	  midlands	  organizer,	  as	  ‘Ed	  wasn’t	  doing	  the	  business	  as	  
leader’	  party	  workers	  stopped	  talking	  about	  him.	  Things	  were	  so	  bad,	  when	  a	  voter	  
was	  reported	  as	  saying	  something	  positive	  about	  their	  leader,	  campaigners	  cheered.	  
As	  they	  put	  it,	  the	  problem	  was	  ‘intangible’,	  the	  reasons	  given	  so	  ‘flimsy’:	  mention	  of	  
Miliband’s	   name	   often	   provoked	   a	   shrug	   and	   a	   sigh,	   no	   explanation	   considered	  
necessary.	  As	  another	  Labour	  worker	  in	  the	  midlands	  reported,	  to	  most	  people,	  ‘he	  
just	  didn’t	  look	  right’.	  	  
	  
5.	  The	  party	  on	  the	  ground	  	  
One	  way	  to	  counteract	  media	  influence	  and	  convince	  people	  of	  Miliband’s	  message	  
was	   to	   reinvigorate	   party	   membership.	   During	   the	   New	   Labour	   years	   this	   had	  
declined	  by	  40%	  to	  below	  200,000.	  But	  even	  before	  then,	  constituencies	   in	  Labour	  
heartlands	  –	  especially	  Scotland	  and	  the	  north	  of	  England	  –	  were	  run	  by	  small	  bands	  
of	  activists	  few	  of	  who	  made	  contact	  with	  voters.	  By	  2010	  the	  situation	  was	  as	  bad	  
as	   it	   had	   ever	   been:	   indeed,	   advocates	   of	   ‘Blue	   Labour’	   believed,	   the	   party’s	  
disconnection	  from	  ordinary	  people	  was	  an	  important	  reason	  for	  its	  defeat.	  	  
As	  part	  of	  moving	  on	  from	  New	  Labour,	  Miliband	  wanted	  Labour	  to	  become	  
‘a	   community	   organization’,	   one	   that	   could	   reach	   out	   to	   those	  millions	   for	  whom	  
party	   politics	   had	   become	   an	   anathema.32	  But,	   according	   to	   Arnie	   Graf,	   the	   US	  
community	   activist	   Miliband	   employed	   to	   give	   the	   initiative	   impetus,	   this	   meant	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Labour	  transforming	  itself	  from	  being	  a	  top-­‐down	  organisation.33	  Graf	  ran	  seminars	  
with	   officials	   and	   activists	   to	   persuade	   them	   to	   embrace	   change	  but	   his	   reception	  
was	  mixed.	   If	   the	  MP	   Tom	  Watson	   became	   a	   fan,	   one	   regional	   organizer	   claimed	  
Graf’s	  vision	  was	   ‘not	  geared	  to	  a	  political	  party	   that	  needs	  to	  win	  an	  election’.	  To	  
prove	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  his	  approach	  Graf	  focused	  his	  work	  in	  Preston	  but	  when	  
Labour	   made	   little	   headway	   there	   during	   the	   2013	   local	   elections	   the	   sceptics	  
prevailed.	   With	   a	   general	   election	   two	   years	   away,	   they	   argued,	   Labour	   should	  
refocus	   on	   conventional	   methods.34	  As	   a	   result,	   one	   Miliband	   advisor	   regretfully	  
noted,	  Graf’s	  was	  ‘a	  road	  not	  taken.’	  	  
If	   Labour	   had	   to	   make	   the	   most	   of	   what	   little	   it	   had,	   the	   party	   actually	  
enjoyed	  a	  good	  record	  of	  doing	   just	  that.	  Thanks	  to	   local	  efforts,	   in	  2010	  the	  party	  
retained	   a	   number	   of	   unlikely	   seats,	   notably	   Birmingham	   Edgbaston.	   To	   promote	  
such	  efforts	  in	  2015,	  the	  party’s	  limited	  resources	  were	  distributed	  to	  constituencies	  
where	  they	  were	  needed	  most.	  This	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  what	  was	  by	  all	  accounts	  a	  
successful	   campaign,	   at	   least	   when	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   voters	   contacted,	  
volunteers	  and	   leaflets	  delivered.	  From	  Scotland	  to	  Kent	  candidates	  and	  organizers	  
described	  2015	  as	  the	  best	  constituency	  campaign	  they	  had	  ever	  fought.	  According	  
to	  one	  midlands	  candidate	   in	  a	  marginal	  Conservative	  seat	   ‘we	  had	  the	  money,	  we	  
had	  the	  resources	  …	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  machine	  the	  party	  delivered.’	  By	  the	  time	  polling	  
day	   approached	   Labour	   claimed	   its	   members	   had	   held	   over	   four	   million	  
‘conversations’	  with	  voters.	  	  
Yet	   however	   good	  was	   the	   effort	   in	   the	   constituencies	   to	  make	   sure	   those	  
identified	  as	  Labour	   supporters	   turned	  out	   to	  vote,	   it	  was	   the	   responsibility	  of	   the	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national	   campaign	   to	   inspire	   people	   to	   want	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   party.	   And,	   many	  
complained,	  that	  was	  where	  lay	  Labour’s	  biggest	  problem.	  
	  
6.	  The	  short	  campaign	  
Just	  as	  the	  transformation	  of	  Labour	  into	  a	  ‘community’	  organisation	  made	  way	  for	  
conventional	   electioneering,	   as	  May	   2015	   approached	  Miliband’s	   ambitious	   policy	  
review	   was	   sidelined	   for	   a	   vote-­‐maximising	   approach.	   Indeed	   –	   especially	   after	  
UKIP’s	   strong	   performance	   in	   the	  May	   2014	   European	   elections	   –	   Labour	   became	  
more	  conservative,	  aiming	  to	  accommodate	  voters’	  preconceptions.	  	  
It	   fell	   further	   back	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   ‘retail	   offers’	   to	   targeted	   groups.	   These	  
were	  however	  no	  substitute	  for	  a	  compelling	  overall	  case	  that	  might	  persuade	  voters	  
from	  diverse	  backgrounds	  to	  support	  the	  party.	  Miliband’s	  2012	  leader’s	  speech	  had	  
advanced	  such	  a	  theme,	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  ‘One	  Nation	  Labour’,	  although	  he	  regarded	  it	  
as	   just	   a	   temporary	   rhetorical	   device.	   It	   nonetheless	   cleverly	   appropriated	   a	  
traditional	   Conservative	   concept,	   one	   also	   adopted	   by	   New	   Labour	   prior	   to	   1997,	  
and	   in	   a	   way	   Miliband’s	   2011	   speech	   had	   not,	   allowed	   him	   to	   claim	   the	   centre	  
ground	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   advancing	   his	   post-­‐New	   Labour	   course	   while	   also	  
isolating	   the	  Conservatives	   as	   the	  party	  of	   the	  privileged	  elite.	  Miliband	  even	  won	  
media	  praise	  for	  his	  efforts.	  For	  a	  time	  everything	  the	  party	  said	  or	  did	  was	  branded	  
‘One	  Nation’.	  Despite	  this,	  a	  September	  2013	  ComRes	  survey	  found	  that	  only	  25%	  of	  
voters	  felt	  they	  knew	  what	  ‘One	  Nation	  Labour’	  meant,	  an	  opinion	  shared	  by	  some	  
Labour	  MPs.	  It	  was	  quietly	  dropped	  and	  by	  2014	  had	  all	  but	  disappeared.35	  	  
Lacking	   a	  persuasive	   theme,	  during	   the	   first	  weeks	  of	   the	  official	   campaign	  
Labour	   did	   its	   best	   to	   address	   its	  main	   shortcomings	  while	   trying	   to	   focus	   voters’	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attention	   on	   the	   Conservative	   threat	   to	   the	   NHS,	   that	   being	   Labour’s	   one	   strong	  
point.	   Miliband	   had	   always	   believed	   he	   could	   overturn	   his	   off-­‐putting	   image,	  
expecting	  a	  series	  of	  televised	  leadership	  debates	  would	  allow	  viewers	  to	  see	  him	  as	  
he	  truly	  was.	  	  Labour	  had	  therefore	  fought	  strongly	  for	  holding	  the	  debates	  along	  the	  
lines	  of	  the	  three	  broadcast	  in	  2010.	  The	  Conservatives	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  sought	  
to	   avoid	   them	  and	  ensured	  Miliband	  would	  only	   share	   the	   stage	  with	  Cameron	   in	  
just	   one	   debate	   –	   and	   then	   with	   five	   other	   leaders.	   Even	   so,	   when	   Miliband	   did	  
appear	   in	  front	  of	  millions	  of	  viewers	  he	  was	  not	  the	  weird-­‐looking	  geek	  of	  tabloid	  
repute.	  But	  perceptions	  built	  over	  the	  years	  were	  too	  strong	  to	  be	  transformed	  in	  a	  
few	  weeks.	  	  
Labour	  used	  its	  manifesto	  launch	  to	  establish	  as	  strongly	  as	  it	  might	  that	  the	  
party	  could	  be	  trusted	  with	  the	  economy.	  Challenging	  voters’	  perceptions,	  Miliband	  
made	  a	  virtue	  of	  the	  modesty	  of	  the	  party’s	  spending	  commitments,	  promising	  that	  
every	  Budget	  would	  cut	  the	  deficit	  until	  it	  had	  disappeared.	  Indeed,	  Labour’s	  pledge	  
to	  increase	  spending	  on	  the	  NHS	  by	  £2.5	  billion	  was	  exceeded	  by	  the	  Conservatives’	  
undertaking	  to	  raise	  it	  by	  £8	  billion.	  Such	  was	  the	  switch-­‐around	  Labour	  appeared	  to	  
have	  become	  the	  more	  fiscally	  prudent	  of	  the	  two	  main	  parties,	  an	  impression	  that	  
did	  the	  party	  in	  Scotland	  only	  harm	  given	  it	  was	  fighting	  the	  ‘anti-­‐austerity’	  SNP.	  	  	  
Despite	   such	   caution,	   Labour	   retained	   policies	   that	   ensured	   the	   rich	   paid	  
their	   share	   in	   reducing	   the	  deficit.	   It	  promised	   to	   reinstate	   the	  50p	   top	   rate	  of	   tax	  
and	  abolish	  the	  ‘non-­‐dom’	  tax	  status	  while	  reviewing	  other	  tax	  avoidance	  schemes.	  
The	   party’s	   extra	   NHS	   spending	   was	   moreover	   to	   be	   partly	   paid	   for	   by	   a	   tax	   on	  
domestic	   properties	   worth	   over	   £2	   million.	   Echoing	   Miliband’s	   earlier	   pledge	   to	  
stand	  up	  for	  the	  ‘Squeezed	  Middle’,	  the	  manifesto	  confirmed	  energy	  bills	  would	  be	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frozen	  under	  a	  Labour	  government,	  as	  would	  train	  fares,	  while	  the	  minimum	  wage	  
would	  be	  raised	  to	  £8	  an	  hour	  and	  the	  ‘bedroom	  tax’	  abolished.	  
To	  counter	  accusations	   it	  was	   ‘anti-­‐business’	   the	  party	   launched	  a	   separate	  
business	  manifesto.	  This	   restated	  Labour’s	  opposition	   to	  an	  EU	  referendum	  due	  to	  
the	  uncertainty	   it	  would	  create	  amongst	  those	  considering	   investing	   in	  Britain.	  The	  
party	  also	  committed	  itself	  to	  building	  up	  the	  country’s	   infrastructure	  through	  high	  
quality	  apprenticeships	  and	  a	  British	  Investment	  Bank.	  Labour	  similarly	  promised	  to	  
lower	  business	  rates	   for	  small	  companies.	  Scepticism	  nonetheless	  remained	  on	  the	  
doorstep.	  As	  with	  Miliband’s	   image,	   Labour	  needed	  more	   time	   to	   tackle	   ingrained	  
doubts	  about	  its	  economic	  trustworthiness.	  	  
In	   any	   case,	   during	   the	   last	   two	  weeks	   of	   the	   campaign,	   Labour’s	   damage-­‐
limitation	  strategy	  was	  blown	  off-­‐course	  by	   the	   ‘coalition	  of	  chaos’	  narrative.	  With	  
opinion	   polls	   showing	   Labour	   neck-­‐and-­‐neck	   with	   the	   Conservatives,	   Cameron’s	  
party	   decided	   to	   frighten	   voters	   with	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   minority	   Miliband	  
government	  dependant	  on	  the	  SNP.	  In	  this	  way	  Labour’s	  collapse	  in	  Scotland	  made	  
its	   decisive	   contribution	   to	   the	   campaign.	   Exploiting	   unappeased	   concerns	   that	  
Miliband	  was	  unfit	  to	  be	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  incapable	  of	  running	  the	  economy,	  the	  
Conservatives	   claimed	   the	   SNP	   would	   force	   Labour	   to	   increase	   spending	   while	  
unravelling	  the	  Union.	  	  
That	   which	   a	   member	   of	   Miliband’s	   team	   called	   the	   Conservative’s	  
‘Goebbels-­‐like’	   demonization	   of	   the	   SNP	   was	   loyally	   echoed	   in	   the	   press	   and	  
translated	   into	   lead	   items	   on	   radio	   and	   television	   news.36	  This	   forced	  Miliband	   to	  
answer	   hypothetical	   questions	   about	   how	   he	   would	   handle	   the	   SNP	   if	   he	   led	   a	  
minority	  government.	  As	  a	  result,	  Labour	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  win	  airtime	  for	   its	  actual	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policies,	   such	   that	   officials	   complained	   to	   the	   BBC	   about	   its	   journalists’	   obsession	  
with	   ‘the	   Scottish	   line’.	   As	   a	   prominent	   Labour	   insider	   conceded,	   the	   party	   just	  
‘didn’t	  have	  a	  narrative	  strand	  to	  challenge	  it’.	  
Party	   workers	   across	   England	   reported	   the	   success	   of	   the	   purported	   SNP	  
threat	   with	   few	   voters	   believing	   a	   ‘weak’	   Miliband	   could	   stand	   up	   to	   a	   ‘strong’	  
Sturgeon.	   Even	   someone	   intending	   to	   vote	   Labour	   in	   an	  East	   London	   constituency	  
was	  reported	  as	  saying:	   ‘I’m	  not	  having	  England	  run	  by	  Jocks’.	   In	  the	  midlands,	  the	  
‘coalition	   of	   chaos’	  was	   said	   to	   have	   firmed	   up	   Conservative	   support,	   drawn	  UKIP	  
supporters	  to	  Cameron’s	  party	  and	  caused	  the	  hitherto	  undecided	  to	   ‘break	  to	  the	  
Tories	  in	  a	  big	  way’	  in	  the	  last	  days.	  
	  
7.	  An	  absence	  of	  statecraft	  
In	  essence,	  Labour	  lost	  the	  general	  election	  because	  it	  was	  led	  by	  someone	  unable	  to	  
convince	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  English	  voters	  he	  possessed	  the	  skills	  necessary	   to	  
be	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  that	  his	  party	  could	  manage	  the	  economy.	  	  	  
Since	   2008	   Labour	   had	   trailed	   the	   Conservatives	   as	   to	   which	   party	   people	  
thought	  best	  able	  to	  run	  the	  economy.	  That	  lead	  varied	  but	  from	  2013	  it	  grew	  as	  the	  
economy	   recovered,	   such	   that	   by	  April	   2015	   Ipsos-­‐Mori	   had	  Cameron’s	   party	   18%	  
ahead.	  When	   pollsters	   Greenberg	   Quinlan	   Rosner	   asked	   voters	   why	   they	   had	   not	  
supported	  Labour	  on	  May	  7th,	  at	  40%,	  concern	  about	  its	  economic	  competence	  was	  
by	   far	   the	  biggest	  overall	   reason.	   Fatally	   for	   Labour,	  middle-­‐class	   voters	  and	   those	  
over	  55	  years	  of	  age	  –	  the	  groups	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  greatest	  numbers	  -­‐	  
cited	  the	  issue	  more	  than	  the	  rest.37	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The	   Greenberg	   survey	   also	   revealed	   that	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   most	   cited	  
motive	  for	  not	  voting	  Labour	  was	  the	  view	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  ‘bossed	  around	  
by	   the	   SNP’	   (24%)	   and	   a	  preference	   for	   Cameron	  over	  Miliband	  as	   Prime	  Minister	  
(17%).	   The	   richest	   and	   oldest	   voting	   cohorts	   expressed	   some	   of	   the	   greatest	  
concerns	   about	  Miliband’s	   statecraft.	   But,	   even	  more	   importantly,	   amongst	   those	  
who	   considered	   voting	   Labour	   but	   ultimately	   supported	   the	   Conservatives	   these	  
reasons	  were	   respectively	   cited	  30%	  and	  32%	  of	   times.	  At	  42%,	   the	  concerns	   such	  
important	   swing	   voters	   held	   about	   Labour’s	   economic	   ability	   were	   a	   little	   higher	  
than	  voters	  overall.	  It	  was	  however	  their	  negative	  perception	  of	  Miliband	  that	  played	  
a	  disproportionate	  role	  in	  determining	  why	  they	  rejected	  his	  party.	  	  	  
The	  Labour	  leader	  had	  correctly	  diagnosed	  the	  country’s	  illness:	  the	  reality	  of	  
declining	   standards	   of	   living	   for	   the	   many	   while	   the	   rich	   grew	   ever	   richer	   was	  
empirically	  hard	  to	  deny.	  But	  he	  failed	  to	  convince	  the	  patient	  that	  he	  was	  the	  right	  
doctor	   to	   administer	   the	   cure.	   Voters	   found	   elements	   of	   Labour’s	   programme	  
attractive,	   but	   Miliband’s	   overall	   post-­‐New	   Labour	   course	   remained	   counter-­‐
intuitive	  to	  most.	  He	  failed	  to	  appreciate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  his	  modest	  challenge	  to	  
neo-­‐liberal	   orthodoxy	   had	   to	   be	   justified	   in	   clear	   and	   popularly	   understandable	  
terms.	   For,	   the	   argument	   that	   austerity	   was	   the	   only	   solution	   to	   the	   deficit	   was	  
something	   deeply	   ingrained	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   those	   middle-­‐income	   voters	   whose	  
support	   Labour	   required.38	  Too	   often,	   Miliband’s	   attitude	   to	   communication	   was	  
inconsistent	  and	  while	  he	  had	   improved	  by	  the	  short	  campaign,	   it	  was	  by	  then	  too	  
late.	   Yet	  even	  had	  he	  been	  as	   skilled	  a	   communicator	  as	   the	  Tony	  Blair	  of	   legend,	  
Miliband	  would	  have	  struggled,	  given	  perceptions	  of	  his	  party’s	  responsibility	  for	  the	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deficit,	  and	  the	  distortions	  to	  which	  he	  was	  personally	  subject.	  Flawed,	  naïve	  agency	  
conspired	  with	  an	  implacable,	  unforgiving	  structure	  to	  defeat	  him.	  	  
In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   broad,	   confident	   and	   comprehensible	   appeal,	   by	   2015	  
Labour	  hid	  behind	  a	  series	  of	  ‘retail	  offers’.	  This	  did	  it	  no	  good.	  For	  many	  voters,	  its	  
enemies	   had	   defined	  what	   they	   took	   to	   be	   the	   character	   of	  Miliband’s	   Labour;	   to	  
others	   it	   remained	   just	   unclear.	   According	   to	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   Unite	   Len	  
McCluskey,	  one	  of	   those	   said	   to	  have	   ‘fixed’	  Miliband’s	  election	  as	   leader:	   ‘Labour	  
had	  no	  central	  theme,	  defining	  what	  it	  stood	  for’.39	  Nick	  Bent,	  Labour’s	  candidate	  for	  
Warrington	   South	  had	   voted	   for	  David	  Miliband,	   but	   also	   felt	   it	  was	   ‘the	   lack	  of	   a	  
clear	  and	  consistent	  Labour	  narrative’	   that	  did	   for	   the	  party.	  This	  widely	  held	  view	  
was	  best	  summed	  up	  by	  a	  midlands	  party	  worker	  who	  stated:	   ‘If	  you	  asked	  people	  
what	   the	   Conservatives	   stood	   for	   they	   could	   easily	   tell	   you	   but	   they	   would	   have	  
struggled	  to	  say	  what	  Labour	  stood	  for’.	  	  
Conceding	   this	   lack	   of	   clarity,	   a	   member	   of	   Miliband’s	   team	   of	   advisors	  
believes	  the	  Labour	  leader	  should	  have	  made	  a	  more	  self-­‐assured	  and	  earlier	  break	  
with	  the	  New	  Labour	  years.	  Whether	  this	  was	  possible,	  and	  would	  have	  succeeded,	  
given	  the	  constraints	  within	  which	  Miliband	  operated	  remains	  a	  moot	  point.	  But,	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  a	  credible	  leader	  articulating	  a	  coherent	  message,	  one	  that	  addressed	  
the	  failures	  of	  the	  past	  and	  outlined	  a	  convincing	  programme	  for	  the	  future,	  it	  is	  no	  
wonder	   many	   English	   voters	   preferred	   a	   Conservative	   party	   led	   by	   a	   relatively	  
credible	   leader	   promising	   comparative	   competence.	   In	   other	   words,	   Labour	   lost	  
because,	  despite	   the	  multiplication	  of	  party	   choice,	   in	  what	   remained	  a	   two-­‐horse	  
race	  to	  become	  Prime	  Minister,	  Miliband	  looked	  to	  be	  the	  least	  safe	  choice.	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